Articles 153 to 167 Make the Governor the Head of a State's Executive, Appointed by the President for Five Years, and Supreme Court Rulings From 1974 to 2025 Mark Where the Governor's Own Discretion Ends

Every Indian state has a Governor, appointed by the President, in whose name the state government acts and who has the first say on every Bill the state legislature passes. Articles 153 to 167 of the Constitution, in force since 26 January 1950, describe the office, which sits inside the arrangement between the Union and the states. Article 163 gives its main rule: a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head aids and advises the Governor, except where the Constitution requires the Governor to act in his own discretion.

Where that exception ends is a question the Supreme Court has been answering since 1974, including in an opinion of 20 November 2025. This piece sets out the text, then the rulings, then what the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended and what became of it.

How a Governor is chosen

A Governor serves each state, and a proviso added on 1 November 1956 lets one person serve two or more (Article 153). Appointment is by the President “by warrant under his hand and seal” (Article 155), and the only qualifications are Indian citizenship and an age of 35 (Article 157). A Governor cannot sit in Parliament or a state legislature, and a member who is appointed is deemed to have left the seat on taking office. No other office of profit is allowed either (Article 158). Before the Chief Justice of the state’s High Court, the Governor swears to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law” (Article 159).

The Constituent Assembly took up the method on 30 and 31 May 1949, on draft Article 131. According to the Constitution of India archive, one version had the Governor elected by direct vote and another had the President choose from a panel of four named by legislators. On 31 May the Assembly settled on appointment by the President and adopted the article. In 2006 the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India quotes Jawaharlal Nehru from that debate saying a Governor “must not be known to be a part of the party machine of that province”.

Nothing in the text tells the President whom to consult. That 2006 judgment quotes the Sarkaria Commission noting that critics trace some Governors’ lack of impartiality to the fact that a Governor is appointed by, and holds office during the pleasure of, the President, “i.e., in effect, the Union Council of Ministers”.

Five years, at the President’s pleasure

Article 156 gives a five-year term, subject to its first clause: the Governor “shall hold office during the pleasure of the President”. Resignation is by writing to the President, and a Governor whose term has ended stays on until a successor takes office.

On 2 July 2004 the President, acting on the Union Council of Ministers’ advice as Article 74 requires, removed the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa. Five judges heard the public interest petition that followed and decided B. P. Singhal v. Union of India on 7 May 2010. Under Article 156, it held, the President can remove a Governor at any time without giving reasons or a hearing. The Court then limited that power, which “will have to be exercised in rare and exceptional circumstances for valid and compelling reasons”. Disagreeing with the Union Government’s policies is no ground, and neither is a change of government at the Centre. Courts will step in only on a prima facie showing of arbitrariness or bad faith, the bench added, and not merely because a different view is possible.

What the Governor does

The state’s executive power sits with the Governor (Article 154), and every executive action of the state government is expressed in the Governor’s name (Article 166). Under Article 164 the Governor appoints the Chief Minister and, on the Chief Minister’s advice, the other ministers, who hold office during the Governor’s pleasure but answer collectively to the Legislative Assembly. Every Council decision on administration and legislation must reach the Governor through the Chief Minister, who must also supply any information asked for (Article 167).

The Governor is also part of the legislature (Article 168). The Governor summons the House, with no more than six months between sittings, prorogues it (ends a session) and may dissolve the Assembly (Article 174), and opens the first session of each year with an address (Article 176). When the House is not sitting and action cannot wait, the Governor may issue an ordinance, which has the force of a state Act and lapses six weeks after the legislature reassembles, sooner if the House disapproves it (Article 213). Pardons and commutations for offences under laws on state subjects are also the Governor’s to grant (Article 161). Article 356 lets the President act on a Governor’s report that a state’s government cannot be carried on under the Constitution (our account of Article 356 covers that route), and a Governor is not answerable to any court for the powers and duties of the office (Article 361).

When a Governor may act without advice

Article 163(1) allows the exception only where the Governor is “by or under this Constitution” required to act in his discretion, and Article 163(2) makes the Governor’s own decision on that question final. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974), seven judges held the Governor to be the “constitutional or formal head of the State”, acting on ministers’ advice except in spheres where the Constitution requires discretion. The Constitution names some: a Governor who also administers a neighbouring Union Territory (Article 239(2)), Nagaland (Article 371A), and the settling of mining royalty disputes between a state government and an autonomous District Council (paragraph 9(2) of the Sixth Schedule).

On 13 July 2016 five judges decided Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker. They held discretion limited to cases where a provision expressly gives it and, additionally, where the provision could not be read otherwise, and they rejected the argument that a discretionary decision is final and beyond judicial review. That judgment adopted the Punchhi Commission’s reading of Article 163 and held that while a Chief Minister has the House’s confidence, ministers’ advice binds the Governor on summoning, proroguing and dissolving, and it quashed an Arunachal Pradesh order of 9 December 2015 that had brought a session forward from 14 January 2016 to 16 December 2015.

For a Budget Session, the Court said on 28 February 2023, the Governor “was plainly bound by the advice” of the Council of Ministers to convene it. Five judges held on 11 May 2023, in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, that a Governor may call on a Chief Minister to prove a majority only on objective material suggesting the House has lost confidence, and wrote that the power “is not an unfettered discretion”. That judgment also referred the correctness of Nabam Rebia to seven judges.

Choosing a Chief Minister after an election with no majority is the other gap in the text, since Article 164(1) says only that the Governor appoints. The Sarkaria Commission proposed an order of preference, which the Supreme Court recorded in Rameshwar Prasad on 24 January 2006: first an alliance formed before the election, second the largest single party claiming to govern with others’ support including independents, third a post-election coalition with all partners in government, and fourth a post-election alliance with some partners in government and the rest supporting from outside. That case ended with the Court holding the Union’s proclamation of 23 May 2005 dissolving the Bihar Assembly unconstitutional, though it let the election already under way go ahead.

Assent, withholding and reservation of state Bills

When a state Bill passes, it goes to the Governor, who declares that he assents, withholds assent, or reserves the Bill for the President (Article 200). A first proviso lets the Governor, “as soon as possible”, return a Bill that is not a Money Bill (under Article 199, one dealing only with matters such as taxes, state borrowing and the custody of state funds) with a message asking the House to reconsider. If the House passes it again, with or without amendment, the Governor “shall not withhold assent”. A second proviso requires the Governor to reserve any Bill that would so reduce the High Court’s powers as to endanger its constitutional position. The President then assents or withholds assent, and may direct that a non-money Bill go back to the House, which must reconsider it within six months (Article 201). No article fixes a deadline for the Governor’s first decision. How a Bill becomes an Act in Parliament follows the parallel route at the Union level.

On 24 April 2023 a two-judge bench disposing of Telangana’s petition recorded that no Bill was pending without action and said the words “as soon as possible” have “significant constitutional content”. On 10 November 2023 a three-judge bench in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab took up four Bills passed at sittings on 19 and 20 June 2023 on which no action had been taken. Reading the first proviso as the course a Governor follows when withholding assent, the bench called “as soon as possible” “a constitutional imperative of expedition” and directed the Governor to decide. No deadline was set, and the bench expressed no view on how he would decide. On 8 April 2025 a two-judge bench in a Tamil Nadu petition did prescribe time limits, among them one month for a Governor acting on ministers’ advice and three months for the President’s decision on a reserved Bill.

The five-judge opinion of 20 November 2025, given on a reference from the President under Article 143, answered differently on several points. Governors have three options under Article 200, the opinion held, and are not bound by ministers’ advice in choosing among them; the merits of the choice cannot be reviewed. On Nabam Rebia, the opinion said it found no compelling reason to depart from the view that Article 200 confers discretion. The Court can still direct a decision within a reasonable time where inaction is “prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite”, the opinion said, but it should not prescribe timelines, and the Constitution does not allow “deemed assent”. It recorded that the parties supporting the reference stressed the absence of any timeline in the text and that those opposing it relied on the 2023 rulings. The President’s side of the same opinion is covered in our account of Article 78.

What the Sarkaria and Punchhi commissions recommended

The Union government set up the Sarkaria Commission in June 1983 under former Supreme Court judge R. S. Sarkaria, and it reported in 1988. As the Supreme Court has quoted it, the Commission proposed that a Governor be eminent in some walk of life, come from outside the state, be a detached figure not too intimately connected with local politics, and not have taken too great a part in politics, particularly recently. The Prime Minister, it said, should consult the Vice-President and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha before choosing one. In 2006 the Supreme Court said it was not seriously disputed that all political parties had observed these criteria in “almost total breach”, and left the matter to the parties.

On tenure, paragraph 4.7.08 said a Governor’s five years should not be disturbed “except very rarely and that too for some extremely compelling reason”, because the President’s pleasure “will not be withdrawn without cause shown”. The Commission added that a Governor should be told the grounds and be allowed to show cause. On Bills, the Supreme Court’s April 2025 Tamil Nadu judgment records that Sarkaria proposed time limits only as conventions, such as one month for a Governor reserving a Bill in his discretion and four months for a presidential decision, and did not propose amending the articles.

The Punchhi Commission, chaired by former Chief Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, submitted its seven-volume report to the Government on 31 March 2010. Nabam Rebia quotes it saying the area for a Governor’s discretion is limited and his choice must be “dictated by reason, actuated by good faith and tempered by caution”. PRS Legislative Research records that it also recommended deleting the words “during the pleasure of the President” so that a Governor could be removed only by a resolution of the state legislature. The 2025 Tamil Nadu judgment records that the report urged time limits for Articles 200 and 201 through a constitutional amendment.

Articles 155 and 156 carry no amendment footnotes in the Constitution’s May 2022 edition. The Press Information Bureau reported on 25 May 2018 that the Inter-State Council’s Standing Committee had finished deliberating on all 273 Punchhi recommendations, to be placed before the Inter-State Council. In its reply to the Rajya Sabha on 8 February 2023, the Ministry of Home Affairs said updated comments were to be obtained from state governments and that a meeting of the Council to discuss the recommendations could not be held.